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RECONSTRUCTING CIVIL SOCIETY THROUGH SIYASAH DUSTURIYAH: AN ANALYSIS OF DDI'S COUNTER-RADICALISM PRAXIS IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT
Since its inception, Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad (DDI) has deliberately positioned itself as a builder of moderate and open Islamic education while remaining outside practical politics. As religious radicalism increasingly penetrates the education sector, this study examines how DDI-affiliated institutions in Makassar implement counter-radicalism through internal institutional regulations and their alignment with national Islamic education policy. Using a qualitative approach, data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, and document analysis, including school policies, curriculum documents, student codes of conduct, and relevant national regulations. The analysis employs two principal instruments of Islamic political jurisprudence (Fiqh Siyasah): Saddu al-Dzari'ah (blocking the means to harm), used to assess whether institutional rules, curriculum design, and school practices function as preventive legal mechanisms against extremist infiltration; and Dar al-Misaq (the nation-state as a covenantal state), used to assess the extent to which these regulations and practices affirm the legitimacy of the nation-state and its constitutional order. The findings show that DDI schools implement an integrated curriculum that combines Local Wisdom (preserving cultural identity) with Global Intelligence (critical thinking and digital literacy), supported by inclusive teaching materials, student organizational activities, the exemplary conduct of teachers, and internal regulations that explicitly reject exclusivism. Viewed through Saddu al-Dzari'ah, these measures operate as a structured preventive system; viewed through Dar al-Misaq, they reinforce institutional commitment to the Indonesian nation-state and public welfare (maslahah). The study concludes that the DDI model constitutes a legal antithesis to transnational movements that undermine the existence of the nation-state, as seen from the perspective of contemporary jurisprudence. It also underscores the role of civil society organizations in countering radicalism not merely through security measures, but through visionary, regulation-based educational governance.

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INTRODUCTION

Religious radicalism poses a persistent challenge to national development, and the education sector is among the arenas where exclusive and intolerant ideologies can take root.[1] Islamic educational institutions are therefore expected to play an active role in instilling moderation and tolerance, and many have adopted counter-narratives as a preventive measure against ideological infiltration, which often circulates through unsupervised channels. Notably, research on the potential for radicalism in educational institutions suggests that the problem is more prevalent in public schools than in religious ones.[2]

Responding to this challenge is not only a pedagogical matter but also a legal and constitutional one. The state has positioned education as an instrument of national integration: the National Education System Law (Law No. 20 of 2003) frames education as a means of developing students' faith, noble character, and democratic citizenship, and subsequent policies, including the anti-terrorism legislation and the national action plan on preventing violent extremism, assign educational institutions a preventive role.[3] Under these frameworks, institutions are expected to safeguard national integration through their regulations, curricula, and everyday practices. This expectation resonates with the tradition of Islamic political jurisprudence (*Fiqh Siyasah*).[4] The principle of *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* (blocking the means to harm) provides a basis for institutional measures that prevent the spread of ideologies threatening public welfare (*maslahah*), while the concept of *Dar al-Misaq* (the nation-state as a covenantal state) grounds Muslims' obligation to uphold the constitutional order established by national

[1] S Arifin, "Islamic Religious Education and Radicalism in Indonesia: Strategy of de-Radicalization through Strengthening the Living Values Education," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 6, no. 1 (2016): 93–126, https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v6i1.93-126.

[2] Noorhaidi Hasan et al., *Literatur Keislaman Generasi Milenial Transmisi, Apropriasi, Dan Kontestasi* (Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 2018).

[3] Moh Kosim, "Pesantren on the Frame of Government Policies," *KARSA Journal of Social and Islamic Culture* 23, no. 2 (2015): 221–41.

[4] Muhammad Abu Dzar, Muntaha Artalim Zaim, and Muhammad Amanullah, "Conceptualizing Siyasah in the Four Sunni Schools: Classical Juristic Debates and the Juristic Logic of Political Flexibility," *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 11, no. 1 (2026): 292–316.

consensus.

Religious educational institutions are not oblivious to the risk of radicalism within their own environments. As religious schools have diversified, some traditional Islamic boarding schools, once known for their inclusive subcultural character, have become exclusive.[5] Such institutions often follow the ideological orientation of their leaders, some of whom maintain links with transnational networks that promote exclusivist or extremist interpretations.[6] Because these networks operate across borders, their influence is difficult to contain. Their proselytizing reaches public spaces and even remote villages, and eastern Indonesia has been identified as one of the regions targeted.[7]

Why is Eastern Indonesia a target for them? Researchers tend to offer different perspectives on this question. However, the simple answer is that the region still has the potential to nurture the seeds of extremist ideology. Unlike other areas, which have sufficient resilience to respond to new ideas that do not align with local values or the majority, Eastern Indonesia lacks such resilience. Such challenges have prompted civil society organizations in the region to play a role in preventing new ideologies from taking root in society. Religious radicalism among students is not a hypothetical risk in Indonesia. A national survey by PPIM UIN Jakarta found that 58.5 percent of students held radical views at the level of opinion, although only about 7 percent reported engaging in radical actions.[8] A survey by the Wahid Foundation and LSI found that 7.7 percent of senior high school students were willing to take radical action,[9] while a more recent Setara Institute–INFID survey recorded an increase in actively intolerant students from 2.4 percent in 2016 to 5 percent in 2023.[10] In South Sulawesi, a 2016 study by the Makassar Religious Research and Development Office estimated that around 10 percent of senior high school students were potentially radical.[11] The threat is also tangible in the city itself: on 28 March 2021, a married couple identified by the police as members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) carried out a suicide bombing at the Makassar

[5] R Ghosh et al., "Can Education Counter Violent Religious Extremism?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 23, no. 2 (2017): 117–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2016.1165713

[6] Moh Roqib, "Increasing Social Class through Islamic Boarding Schools in Indonesia," *Journal of Social Studies Education Research* 12, no. 2 (2021): 305–29.

[7] Anwar Amir Daeng Sirua and Mas Agus Priyambodo, "Kebijakan Pemerintah Dalam Menanggulangi Terorisme Di Wilayah Indonesia Bagian Timur (Poso)," *Jurnal Kewarganegaraan* 6, no. 1 (2022): 2161–68.

[8] laporan survei nasional 2017 tentang pandangan keagamaan siswa dan guru PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, "Laporan Survei Nasional 2017 Tentang Pandangan Keagamaan Siswa Dan Guru," 2017.

[9] Wahid Foundation dan Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), "Survei 2016 Terhadap 1.520 Siswa Di 34 Provinsi," n.d.

[10] Setara Institute dan INFID, "Survei Toleransi Siswa Sekolah Menengah Atas, 2023," 2023.

[11] Balai Litbang Agama Makassar, "Penelitian Radikalisme Di Sekolah, 2016," n.d.

Cathedral,[12] followed by dozens of arrests of people linked to the same network. Studies suggest that radical views enter schools through classroom instruction by teachers, textbooks, alumni influence on student activities, and weak policies at the level of school leadership or foundations.

Against this background, Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad (DDI) presents a significant case. Founded in 1943 in South Sulawesi by Anregurutta Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle, DDI has consistently refrained from practical politics and has instead focused on developing Islamic education in the Sulawesi region. Unlike many Islamic organizations of the time that were directly involved in the independence movement, DDI chose the path of community struggle through education.[13] Existing studies describe DDI institutions as sites of moderate religious practice and as actors in efforts to counter radicalization.[14] However, these studies do not provide baseline data on radicalism indicators within DDI schools in Makassar.[15]

From the outset, DDI has placed education as the cornerstone for shaping a generation of Muslims who are knowledgeable, virtuous, and open to diversity.[16] DDI's educational orientation not only integrates religious and general knowledge but also emphasizes the development of an inclusive and moderate religious worldview. These values have been consistently upheld and applied across all levels of education under DDI's umbrella. In the contemporary context, where radical ideologies are increasingly infiltrating educational spaces, DDI's approach merits further research and exploration.

This article examines how counter-radicalism values are implemented in schools affiliated with Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad (DDI) in Makassar. It asks which strategies and educational approaches these institutions use to curb radicalism and internalize moderate religious attitudes among students, and how the institutional regulations and practices behind those strategies can be assessed through Islamic political jurisprudence (*Fiqh Siyasah*).

Existing scholarship offers important context but does not answer this question.

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[12] Nur Alamsyah Putra, Ariana Ariana, and I Made Oges John Suteja, "Implementation of the Government's Deradicalization Policy to Former Terrorism Convict in Makassar City," in *World Conference on Governance and Social Sciences (WCGSS 2023)* (Atlantis Press, 2024), 64–70.

[13] Muhammad Taufik, M Afif Ansori, and An An Andari, "Dynamics of Darul Dakwah Wal Irsyad Education Institute," *Scaffolding: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam Dan Multikulturalisme* 5, no. 3 (2023): 140–56. https://doi.org/10.37680/scaffolding.v5i3.3479

[14] Muhammad Alwi HS, Iin Parninsih, and Nahla Fakhriyah Alwi, "Moderasi Beragama Pesantren: Jaringan Dan Paham Keagamaan As' Adiyah, Darul Da'Wah Wal Irsyad, Dan Nahdlatul Ulum Sulawesi Selatan," *Dialog* 45, no. 1 (2022): 41–56.

[15] Samsir Samsir, "Gerakan Pendidikan Dan Sosial Keagamaan Daarud Dakwah Wal-Irsyad (Ddi) Di Sulawesi Selatan," *Lentera: Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah Dan Komunikasi* 14, no. 1 (2012): 145173.

[16] Muhammad Rasyid Ridha AD, "Keikhlasan Dan Keteladanan AGH Abd. Rahman Ambo Dalle Terhadap Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Darud Da'wah Wal-Irsyad (DDI)." (IAIN Parepare, 2022).

Research on radicalism in education has mapped its prevalence and channels, such as the national survey of Generation Z (born 1997–2012) by PPIM and Convey,[17] Burhanuddin's study of preventing radical ideas in education,[18] and Munip's analysis of translated jihad textbooks.[19] Other work examines the religious characteristics of specific movements, such as the educational orientation of Khilafatul Muslimin, or situates radicalism within religious purification and politicization,[20] changing media landscapes,[21] and social movements.[22] These studies explain *how radical ideas spread*, not *how institutions resist them*.

Studies of DDI itself have addressed a different question. Recent work has examined DDI's networks and religious models as a basis for moderation,[23] its institutional development,[24] its curriculum and *kiai* figures in a West Sulawesi boarding school,[25] and its historical transformation in the Ajatappareng region.[26] Theological and cultural foundations of DDI's moderation are therefore relatively well documented, as are its history and institutional growth. Muhsin et al. come closest to this study by examining how teachers at DDI Mangkoso adapt their methods to prevent radicalism.[12] However, their focus is the teaching methods of individual teachers in a single boarding school.

The gap this article addresses is therefore not theological, historical, or one of community engagement. It lies in three places. First, it is a gap in institutional mechanisms: existing studies do not systematically analyze how school regulations, curricula, student organizations, and teacher conduct operate together as a counter-radicalism system. Second, it

[17] Institut Agama Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah. Pusat Pengkajian Islam, *Api Dalam Sekam: Keberagaman Muslim Gen-z: Survei Nasional Tentang Keberagaman Di Sekolah Dan Universitas Di Indonesia* (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2018).

[18] Nanang Burhanuddin, *Pencegahan Paham Radikal Di Dunia Pendidikan Dalam Prespektif Al-Qur'an* (Universitas PTIQ Jakarta, 2021).

[19] Abdul Munip, "Buku Jihad Terjemahan Dari Bahasa Arab Dan Potensi Radikalisme Beragama Di Lembaga Pendidikan," *Cendekia: Jurnal Kependidikan Dan Kemasyarakatan*, 2017, 175–96. https://doi.org/10.21154/cendekia.v15i2.1080

[20] Ivan Safranchuk and Rustam Makhmudov, "Contemporary Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia: Genesis and History of Development," *Politics and Religion Journal* 18, no. 2 (2024): 243–67.

[21] Yousef M Aljamal, "From Radicalism To Tolerance: Media Coverage of the Muslim World League," *Политикологија Религије* 16, no. 1 (2022): 95–110.

[22] Dadang Kuswana, Deden Sumpena, and Yoshy Hendra Hardiyan Syah, "The Religion and Social Movements in Indonesia: Analysis of Contemporary Problems, Their Impacts, and Their Implications A Review of the Theory of Relative Deprivacy," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 14, no. 2 (2024): 351–80.

[23] HS, Parninsih, and Alwi, "Moderasi Beragama Pesantren: Jaringan Dan Paham Keagamaan As' Adiyah, Darul Da'Wah Wal Irsyad, Dan Nahdlatul Ulum Sulawesi Selatan."

[24] Taufik, Ansori, and Andari, "Dynamics of Darul Dakwah Wal Irsyad Education Institute."

[25] Muhammad Nur Murdan and Syarifuddin Syarifuddin, "Melacak Praktik Moderasi Beragama Pada Pondok Pesantren Syekh Hasan Yamani Dan Pondok Pesantren Darud Da'wah Wal Irsyad Baruga Di Sulawesi Barat," *PUSAKA* 13, no. 1 (2025): 66–87.

[26] Mansur Mansur et al., "THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION AND ITS CONTRIBUTION IN THE AJATAPPARENG REGION: A Historical Perspective of Darud Da'wah Wal-Irsyad," *Edukasi Islami: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 14, no. 03 (2025): 961–72.

is a normative-legal gap: none of the studies reviewed here evaluates these mechanisms through the concepts of *Fiqh Siyasah*, even though the obligation of educational institutions to safeguard national integration is a matter of both state policy and Islamic legal reasoning. Third, it is a contextual gap: these studies concentrate on boarding schools and madrasas in Barru, Majene, Soppeng, and Sidenreng Rappang, while DDI-affiliated schools in Makassar, a city where a Jamaah Ansharut Daulah-linked suicide bombing occurred in 2021, remain unexamined.

To address these gaps, this article uses *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* (blocking the means to harm) to assess whether institutional rules, curricula, and school practices function as preventive mechanisms against extremist infiltration, and *Dar al-Misaq* (the nation-state as a covenantal state) to assess how far these mechanisms affirm the legitimacy of the nation-state and public welfare. Methodologically, it triangulates observation, in-depth interviews, and document analysis, including internal school regulations, curriculum documents, and relevant national policy, so that practices can be compared against the rules that govern them. In doing so, it contributes an integrated model combining Local Wisdom (cultural identity) and Global Intelligence (critical thinking and digital literacy), analyzed as a legal-preventive strategy of a civil society organization.

METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach to examine how counter-radicalism values are implemented in DDI-affiliated schools in Makassar. A qualitative approach is appropriate because it allows the researcher to explore the meanings, experiences, and perspectives of the people involved, and to examine not only what the institutions do but also why and how their counter-radicalism strategies are formulated and implemented. The study distinguishes two roles of DDI that are often conflated and treats them as separate units of analysis. As a social organization, DDI is a civil society actor whose authority rests on its da'wah and educational mission, its legitimacy within the community, and the exemplary conduct of its teachers and leaders. As a legal actor, DDI is an organization with legal-entity status that issues internal rules binding its institutions and members, is itself bound by national regulation, and, through its schools, carries out the state's expectation that educational institutions safeguard national integration, thereby supporting the state's ideological defense system. Separating these roles allows the study to ask different questions of each: what the organization does socially, and what it regulates, commits to, and is accountable for legally.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation, and document analysis, with each technique linked to one or both roles. To examine DDI as a social organization, semi-

structured interviews were conducted with school principals, teachers, and community leaders who serve as educators at DDI institutions, and observations were made of student organizational activities and teaching practices. These techniques make it possible to see which counter-radicalism strategies and values are practiced and how they work in daily school life. The interviews followed a prepared guide that kept the discussion focused on the research topic, while follow-up questions allowed the researcher to pursue participants' narratives and emerging field findings.[27] To examine DDI as a legal actor, the study analyzed its internal regulations, such as organizational statutes, foundation and school regulations, and codes of conduct, together with curriculum documents, learning modules, and activity reports, and read them against relevant national regulations on education, civil society organizations, and the prevention of violent extremism. This analysis asks what rules DDI sets for its institutions and how far they align with the state's expectations on national integration. Document analysis also provides institutional and historical context and helps verify information from interviews. Finally, findings from interviews and observation were compared with the written documents to assess whether written rules are consistent with field practice.

The data were coded and grouped into categories corresponding to the two roles of DDI, and the analysis then applied two concepts of Islamic political jurisprudence (*Fiqh Siyasah*). *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* (blocking the means to harm) was used to assess whether rules, curricula, and school practices function as preventive mechanisms against extremist infiltration. *Dar al-Misaq* (the nation-state as a covenantal state) was used to assess how far these mechanisms affirm the legitimacy of the nation-state and public welfare. Triangulating interviews, observation, and documents allowed the researcher to compare participants' statements with written evidence, which strengthens the validity of the findings and reduces bias. The results are expected to provide an in-depth understanding of counter-radicalism strategies and practical recommendations for strengthening peace education and tolerance in schools.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Value of Counter-Radicalism

The value of counter-radicalism is now an important subject that is taught in a planned and continuous manner, both in the community and in formal educational institutions. This is inseparable from the increasingly massive radicalism campaigns that target various groups, from

[27] John W Creswell and J David Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Sage publications, 2017).

young people and the general public to academics.[28] The spread of radical ideology occurs through many channels, both in the real world, such as lectures, closed-door discussions, informal meetings, and in the virtual world, which utilizes social media, video channels, podcasts, and online forums. These campaigns are often wrapped in narratives of morality, justice, or calls to return to pure religious teachings,[29] making them appear convincing to those who lack adequate knowledge.[30] Is this pattern of religious understanding limited to religious figures or preachers who lack adequate scholarly training, or is it a result of their newfound status as religious leaders? It seems that these factors do not entirely determine one's radical religious outlook.[31] Even those who were formerly members of other puritanical religions can become moderate after converting to Islam.[32]

The emergence of such preachers has facilitated a shift in religious authority.[33] Previously, society learned and sought guidance from established institutions, but this has been replaced by new authorities.[34] This shift indicates a more dominant trend toward a new, massive network of authority through the digital and political spheres, giving rise to new figures with many followers. This pattern shows that the landscape of Islam in Indonesia has entered a phase of more intense competition for authority, with tangible impacts on the stability of religious tolerance or attitudes toward minorities.[35]

In the midst of this situation, the role of teachers becomes very strategic. Within the school environment, teachers can integrate counter-radicalism values into subjects such as Pancasila Education, Religious Education, and extracurricular activities that encourage collaboration among students from different backgrounds. Values such as tolerance, respect for differences, peaceful conflict resolution, and respect for the law can be taught not only

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[28] Islam, *Api Dalam Sekam: Keberagaman Muslim Gen-z: Survei Nasional Tentang Keberagaman Di Sekolah Dan Universitas Di Indonesia*.

[29] Aljamal, "From Radicalism To Tolerance: Media Coverage of the Muslim World League."

[30] Ali Mostfa, "Violence and Jihad in Islam: From the War of Words to the Clashes of Definitions," *Religions* 12, no. 11 (2021): 966.

[31] A R Zulfahmi and Muhammad Sa'ad Gadallah, "Eco-Jihad as a Catalyst for Social Transformation: An Interdisciplinary Study of Islamic Environmental Law in Mitigating Climate Change," *Tasdiruna* 1, no. 1 (2026): 13–28.

[32] Erik Magnusson, "On Religion, Polemics, and Identity in Vinnie Paz's Lyrics," *Contemporary Islam*, 2025, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-025-00582-3

[33] Muhammad Irsyadillah Munir et al., "Uang Panai' in Bugis Community Marriages in Mimika Regency: A Perspective of Sociology of Islamic Law," *Tasdiruna* 1, no. 1 (2026): 67–85.

[34] Alexander R Arifianto, "Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia," *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (2020): 37–50. https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.10

[35] Thita M Mazya, Kholis Ridho, and Ali Irfani, "Religious and Cultural Diversity in Indonesia: Dynamics of Acceptance and Conflict in a Multidimensional Perspective," *International Journal of Current Science Research and Review* 7, no. 7 (2024): 4932–45.

theoretically but also through direct practice, such as conflict resolution simulations or group projects involving students from diverse backgrounds.[36] However, the problem is that these insights are often overlooked, with the excuse that they are not part of the true teachings of Islam. Or, in some cases in public schools, teachers of any subject tend to act more like religion teachers than actual religion teachers. As a result, the religious narratives presented tend to follow a partial and black-and-white understanding.[37]

This binary understanding of religion is close to radicalism, as there are indications of a claim to absolute truth and a willingness to blame others who are considered different. Is this wrong? The answer is not simple, but if these seeds continue to grow until they surface as actions that do not consider tolerance and respect, then they have entered the realm of radicalism.[38] Once these seeds have surfaced, community leaders, religious figures, and informal educators begin to instill counter-radicalism values through religious study forums, youth training programs, or cross-community social activities. It is important to create an open space for dialogue where different views can be discussed without fear or suspicion. However, this is only possible for the elite. Meanwhile, religious views are deeply rooted in society, which means that efforts to counter radicalism should be carried out at the grassroots level.[39]

According to Ismail et al., this means that counter-radicalism campaigns need to be communicated in a down-to-earth language, using examples relevant to people's lives. Digital literacy is an important part of this, given that most radical propaganda now operates online. People need to be equipped with the ability to recognize fake news, hate speech, or calls for violence.[40] Even though these ideologies are often cloaked in issues of social dissatisfaction, economic inequality, or feelings of marginalization. Therefore, teaching counter-radicalism values is not sufficient if it only emphasizes ideological aspects; it must also be linked to efforts to build social solidarity, empathy, and concern for shared problems. When individuals feel they are part of a supportive community, they are less likely to be influenced by extremist calls.

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[36] R A Amirrachman, "Peace Education in the Moluccas, Indonesia: Between Global Models and Local Interests," *UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)(Nd)*, 2012.

[37] Islamina, *Narasi Radikalisme-Terorisme Tahun 2022 Laporan Tahunan*, 2023.

[38] Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension* (Liverpool University Press, 2013).

[39] Ahmad Munawar Ismail, Wan Kamal Mujani, and AHMAD AIMAN ZUHAILY AM, "Methods of Da'wah and Social Networks in Dealing with Liberalism and Extremism.," *Islāmiyyāt: International Journal of Islamic Studies* 40, no. 2 (2018).

[40] M Affan and A Thohir, "Online Religious Radicalism: A Global Proxy Warfare Model in Indonesia," 2020. https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.1-10-2019.2291690

Media outlets such as *Bulletin Kaffah*, *Al-Islam, Media Umat*, and similar publications used to frequently disseminate this narrative by distributing materials to places of worship and offices. The narrative pattern was similar, presenting social and political issues framed as far from ideal, and ultimately offering the idea of a caliphate as a solution. It is problematic to draw a narrow conclusion that the caliphate system can solve complex social problems. Historically, this system has also been plagued by acute controversies, leading to civil wars and the sacrifice of civilian lives.[41]

However, the emergence of such narratives in the Indonesian context also indicates that the nation deeply values democracy. The next question arises: how does democracy respond to pluralism, which should inherently be granted equal standing? Regardless of this debate, the religious ideas of these groups clearly exhibit partial and *binary* thinking, viewing religious laws and phenomena as purely black and white. It must also be acknowledged that similar narratives continue to circulate in cyberspace or within small circles attended by the general public. Despite the government's efforts to respond legally by dissolving their formal structures, such as the (Unity of the Indonesian People) movement, as done by the government against groups like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and others.[42]

Intolerance in Indonesia is not confined to rhetoric; it also takes the form of physical acts against minority worship. In May 2024, residents broke up a Rosary prayer by Catholic students of Pamulang University in South Tangerang, injuring one student and leading police to name four suspects, including the neighborhood head. In June 2025, a crowd dispersed a Christian student retreat at a villa in Cidahu, Sukabumi, and damaged the building. A month later, in July 2025, a prayer house of a Christian congregation in Padang, West Sumatra, was attacked and damaged during worship and religious instruction. The teachings of the Khalwatiyah Samman Order on trial, an episode demonstrating how religious authority was contested too and deployed as an instrument of political control by a radical movement.[43] Disputes over the establishment of places of worship in several regions follow a similar pattern, and the burden of such rejections falls disproportionately on minority communities.

These incidents are not equivalent to organized radicalism, but they matter because they show how intolerance becomes a social environment in which radical narratives can take root. Their persistence is better explained by three factors than by treating each case as an isolated

[41] Ainur Rofiq Al Amin, *Membongkar Proyek Khilafah Ala Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HC)* (LKiS Pelangi Aksara, 2012).

[42] Lembaga Survei Indonesia, *LAPORAN SURVEI NASIONAL: Kekerasan Ekstrem, Toleransi, Dan Kehidupan Beragama Di Indonesia* (Jakarta, 2022).

[43] Muhammad Arif et al., "From Ritual Community to Political Actor: The Transformation and Power Strategies of The Khalwatiyah Samman Order in South Sulawesi," *Jurnal Al-Dustur* 8, no. 2 (2025): 120–34.

outburst. First, there is legal ambiguity: rules on prayer houses and permits for places of worship are open to multiple interpretations, which gives local actors an administrative justification for acting against minority worship. Second, enforcement and resolution are inconsistent; police have named suspects in each case, but pressure for reconciliation and disputes over suspended detention weaken the deterrent signal that the state protects the constitutional right to worship. Third, and central to this article, is an epistemological factor: a religious understanding that treats difference as a threat rather than as a condition of shared citizenship. Such understanding is documented among students and teachers in national surveys, and it can turn disputes of other origins into religious conflict, as the contested motive in the South Tangerang case suggests. Strengthening epistemological understanding of religious belief is therefore a priority program of DDI in countering radicalism, particularly in Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia.

Implementation of Counter-Radicalism in DDI

The emergence of radicalism in recent decades has become a global phenomenon that has impacted society at the grassroots level. However, it is generally tied to political agendas and agendas to purify Islamic teachings according to their interpretation.[44] Radicalism spreads through various channels, from online literacy that is rampant on social media to direct interactions within communities. Their strategies are clever yet dangerous, targeting those who are enthusiastic about learning religion but lack proper and authoritative guidance. Additionally, they make claims of absolute truth in matters such as creed or religious beliefs, which are then manifested in a movement.[45] In such conditions, they become vulnerable to narratives that distort religious teachings for ideological purposes.[46]

Recognizing this danger, religious mass organizations (Ormas) in Indonesia have taken on a strategic role in instilling counter-radicalism values. Although many consider this step to be too late, as radicalism has already taken root in some communities, Ormas continue to strive to restore the situation. They are mobilizing all their resources in education, preaching, social work,

[44] Safranchuk and Makhmudov, "Contemporary Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia: Genesis and History of Development."

[45] Kuswana, Sumpena, and Syah, "The Religion and Social Movements in Indonesia: Analysis of Contemporary Problems, Their Impacts, and Their Implications A Review of the Theory of Relative Deprivacy."

[46] Hasan et al., *Literatur Keislaman Generasi Milenial Transmisi, Apropriasi, Dan Kontestasi.*

and even politics to reclaim spaces long occupied by radical groups.[47] DDI is among those contributing to this effort by leveraging the educational institutions it oversees.[48]

Historically, DDI began as an Islamic mass organization (ormas) originating from South Sulawesi. However, DDI actually began with the establishment of Madrasah Arabiyah Islamiyah (MAI) in Mangkoso on December 21, 1938, by A.G.H. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle. Shortly after its establishment, DDI already had several branches in other regions such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, and the Maluku Islands. Previously, the founder of DDI, Ambo Dalle, along with A.G.H. Muhammad As'ad al-Bugisi, established a similar madrasah in Sengkang in 1930, which is now known as the As'adiyah Islamic Boarding School.[49]

Not far from the popularity of As'adiyah, the madrasah established by Ambo Dalle also received a warm welcome from the people of South Sulawesi, leading to the opening of MAI in several areas in South Sulawesi. A new challenge also emerged, namely the awareness to establish an organization to oversee these madrasahs. Several names for the new institution emerged, such as Nashrul Haq proposed by A.G.H. Muhammad Abduh Pabbajah, al-Urwatul Wutsqa proposed by A.G.H. Muhammad Tahir Usman, and Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad proposed by A.G.H. Abdurrahman Firdaus, which was eventually selected as the name of the organization.[50]

The founding meeting of DDI was held on February 17, 1947, at MAI Mangkoso, inviting religious scholars and teachers from MAI across South Sulawesi. The outcome of the meeting was the establishment of the organizational structure, with A.G.H. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle as the first chairman of DDI, A.G.H. Muhammad Daud Ismail as the youth chairman, and A.G.H. Muhamad As'ad Bugis as the chairman of the advisory board. The first central office of DDI was located in Mangkoso before being moved to Parepare in 1950. During the Old Order, DDI did not declare political affiliation to any particular party. DDI members were free to choose any party without using the name DDI, such as A.G.H. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle who joined PSII. During the New Order, some DDI leaders joined the Functional Groups at the urging of the central government. In 1993, the DDI headquarters was moved again to Makassar. After A.G.H. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle passed away in 1996, the position of Chairman of the Central Board of Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad (PB DDI) was temporarily held by

[47] Muh Fajri Munawwir, Sri Wahyuni Rustam, and Haerul Anwar, "Reconceptualizing Social Security as State-Led Hibah: Islamic Legal Transformation and Social Protection for Informal Workers," *Tasdiruna* 1, no. 1 (2026): 1–12.

[48] "Informant P1 ," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, July 20, 2025.

[49] DDI Team, *Notes on the Establishment of DDI (Darud Da'wah Wa Al-Irsyad)* (Jakarta, 2025).

[50] Samsir, "Gerakan Pendidikan Dan Sosial Keagamaan Daarud Dakwah Wal-Irsyad (DDI) Di Sulawesi Selatan." 149

A.G.H. Sanusi Baco until the next DDI Congress in 1999. During the organizational escalation in 2015, in the presence of A.G.H. Ali Yafie (Chairman of the DDI Council of Elders), it was agreed by the DDI family that there would be one DDI.[51]

From its inception to the present, DDI has focused on jihad in the field of education. As a mass organization, it has established schools, Islamic boarding schools, and non-formal educational institutions that strive to integrate moderate religious views in line with national ideals.[52] Therefore, the curriculum is not only based on teaching religious knowledge through the study of classical Arabic texts but also emphasizes openness and application to the social context of society, with a focus on the common good. Through this approach, young people are equipped with critical thinking skills to distinguish between authentic religious teachings and misleading ideological propaganda.[53]

This contribution is quite optimal as a grassroots movement that is directly in touch with the community. This is because many DDI cadres, upon graduating from Islamic boarding schools and schools, serve as preachers, muballigh, and dai to fill the pulpits that were previously often used by radical groups. Karsono, in one of his studies, revealed the network pattern of the Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (KPPSI) and the Jundullah Militia in South Sulawesi since 2000, led by Agus Dwikarna. In a short time, LJ (Laskar Jundullah) established branches in various districts of South Sulawesi and Central Sulawesi and recruited volunteers for jihad in Poso, alongside moral patrols such as raids on alcohol sellers and other places of vice. LJ established a " " relationship with JI (Jamiyyah Islamiyyah) by sharing human resources, training materials, and combat networks in Poso and Maluku.[54]

The Sulawesi region has long been discussed by researchers as a place where radical organization leaders spread across the area are veterans of Afghanistan and educators in certain pesantren networks. Strong suspicions also link the region to Mindanao, which served as a training hub (1996–2000) with a curriculum on explosives, shooting, and small-scale tactics that once recruited members from South Sulawesi. This pattern indicates that networks entering South Sulawesi and the Sulawesi region in general are interconnected with global Islamic movements. DDI is fully aware of this danger, although educators at educational institutions

[51] DDI, *Founding Notes of* 2025

[52] "Informant T1," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, July 20, 2025.

[53] "Informant T2," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, July 23, 2025.

[54] Karsono Karsono, "Gerakan Islam Radikal Di Sulawesi Selatan: Pola Rekrutmen Dan Pola Gerakan Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) Dan Laskar Jundullah," *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional* 4, no. 2 (2018): 231–46.

interviewed by the author stated that it is not easy to break the chain of radical ideology that has spread widely among the community. However, they remain optimistic that through structured and sustained efforts, it is possible to reclaim influence in the hearts of the people.[55]

The first foundation built by DDI School includes developing religious understanding, particularly the aspects of monotheism and morals as the main basis for curriculum development. This foundation does not stand alone, but is supported by sociological and cultural considerations, integrated with a legal-policy framework, as well as philosophical and psychological references for students.[56] In addition to a curriculum based on the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kemenag), several DDI schools also adhere to principles developed from religious foundations and educational patterns taught by A.G., H. Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle, *the Founding Father.* This means that the schools subject to this research also integrate local traditions and pesantren experiences as references for learning. This composition reflects a dual orientation: preserving the purity of religious values while opening space for adaptation to the social context of the students.

This awareness is embedded in the learning content, which intentionally includes anti-extremism and tolerance materials. The prominent pattern is not in the form of standalone subjects but rather cross-curricular integration and character-building programs. In other words, the approach taken is "*value embedding,"* such as sharing Islamic stories like those of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions who exemplified good religious character. This helps students develop religious moderation, social empathy, and diversity literacy as cross-disciplinary competencies. Although effective in fostering an inclusive classroom atmosphere, this model appears to still require more standardized modules to ensure consistent learning outcomes can be measured uniformly. This is because, when the author observed the field, there were no explicit teaching materials conveying these messages. Although some informants mentioned that value embedding was incorporated into lessons through active dialogue or lectures.[57]

Active dialogue and lectures that create an optimal environment are indeed quite contributory. Additionally, from the educators' capacity perspective, some of them have received training to identify radicalism potential in students, although others have not. This inevitably impacts the diversity of early detection quality in the field. In schools with strong training, teachers tend to have clearer behavioral indicators, safe communication techniques, and well-structured

[55] "Informant T3," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, 2025.
[56] "Informant P1," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, July 20, 2025.
[57] "Informant T1," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, July 20, 2025.

referral processes. Conversely, in schools that have not received adequate training, prevention relies on general awareness campaigns and teachers' personal intuition.

The DDI obtained detection training through partnerships with external institutions such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the district/city police, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), the Office of Community and Political Affairs (Kesbangpol), and other religious organizations that have been established in the majority of schools. The training ranges from socialization, seminars, workshops, to counter-radicalism program assistance. However, the nature of these partnerships tends to be *event-based* and incidental.[58] In fact, to increase effectiveness, schools need more sustainable collaboration patterns. For example, regular mentoring, updating materials in line with the dynamics of the issue, and documented feedback mechanisms to assess medium-term impacts.

Informants described the relationships among teachers, counselors, and students as effective channels of early awareness. According to them, schools did not observe significant indicators of radical tendencies among students, and only sporadic findings were reported. In this article, radical tendencies are understood as the erosion of the four commitments that the Ministry of Religious Affairs uses to define religious moderation, namely national commitment, tolerance, rejection of violence, and accommodation of local culture, as expressed in a student's statements or conduct.[59] When such findings appeared, the response typically began with a personal and persuasive approach, followed by counseling through guidance counselors or homeroom teachers, strengthening tolerance literacy in learning, and, where necessary, coordination with external parties. This graduated sequence reflects ethical and pedagogical preparedness, because it treats the student first as a learner to be guided and only later as a matter requiring outside intervention.

From the perspective of *Fiqh Siyasah,* however, preparedness of this kind is not yet sufficient. The principle of *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* requires that measures to block the means of harm be established before harm materializes, so that protection does not depend on whether a case happens to appear. A pattern of work that reacts when new cases arise therefore falls short of this standard, however sound each individual response may be. Not all schools have documented early-detection procedures covering indicators, risk assessment, parental involvement, and multi-layered referral. Normatively, this absence matters in two ways. First, state education policy

[58] "Informant P1," interview by Muhammad Suaib Tahir, July 20, 2025.
[59] Aceng Abdul Aziz et al., "Implementasi Moderasi Beragama Dalam Pendidika Islam," 2019.

already expects educational units to prevent violence and intolerance through formal mechanisms, so documented procedures are part of an institution's obligation to safeguard national integration rather than an optional refinement. Second, without agreed indicators and recording procedures, an institution cannot demonstrate systematically that its environment is free of radical tendencies. The findings above should accordingly be read as the absence of *reported* indicators, not as proof that none exist, and the lack of standard protocols limits institutional evaluation and learning when cases arise.

Overall, the author observes a pattern of prevention efforts that have strong values, are able to network externally, and have pedagogical awareness of the importance of open religious insight. However, there is no standardization of anti-extremism learning materials so that they are not merely value-infused but also have measurable indicators of achievement. Next is related to the equitable distribution of teacher training so that early detection and intervention competencies do not depend on personal initiatives. This should be supplemented by the institutionalization of integrated SOPs, from detection, intervention, to referral, which enable periodic monitoring and evaluation. By strengthening these three pillars, schools have the opportunity to transition from an incidental prevention model to a proactive, data-driven, and sustainable management framework.

At the school policy level, the implication is the need to build a structured "moderation ecosystem." This is complemented by cross-curricular modules aligned with the Pancasila Student Profile and Religious Moderation, a teacher capacity-building program on the " " based on local case studies, and a partnership calendar that is not merely ceremonial. At the operational level, semester-based evaluations of student understanding, the effectiveness of interventions, and the quality of internal–external coordination serve as key instruments. Thus, schools not only instill values but also establish systems that ensure these values operate in a measurable, auditable manner and contribute to strengthening students' resilience against extremist narratives.

DDI also develops a counter-radicalism strategy through the harmonization of local cultural values and global intelligence within educational practices. This approach positions education as a space for character formation that emphasizes not only religious cognitive aspects but also the social and cultural dimensions of students. Through this strategy, DDI seeks to build ideological resilience in a preventive manner by internalizing values and strengthening students' critical capacities.

Local wisdom is positioned as the primary foundation for character development, particularly values such as mutual respect, humanizing others, safeguarding dignity (*siri'*), and the culture of mutual reminding (*sipakainge*). These values are regarded as social capital that has long been embedded within the community, giving them strong influence in shaping a polite, balanced, and inclusive religious attitude. The integration of local values enables students to understand religion contextually and to orient their religious practices toward social harmony.

The internalization of these local cultural values is carried out systematically through classroom learning processes, teacher–student interactions, and everyday school life. Rather than being implemented through doctrinal instruction, this approach relies on role modeling, dialogue, and the habituation of attitudes. In this way, schools function as social spaces that cultivate empathy, tolerance, and inclusivity as integral components of students' religious identity.

At the same time, DDI equips students with global intelligence, encompassing critical thinking skills, digital literacy, and openness to global diversity. These competencies are essential for enabling students to understand differences in religious perspectives proportionally, to analyze religious discourses rationally, and to critically filter information circulating in digital spaces. Strengthening these capacities is particularly important amid the rapid flow of global information, which is often exploited to disseminate extremist narratives.

The harmonization of local values and global competencies allows students not only to remain firmly rooted in their socio-cultural identity but also to engage constructively with global dynamics. This combination fosters sustainable resilience against extremist narratives, as students possess strong moral foundations, social sensitivity, and adequate intellectual capacity. Accordingly, DDI's strategy demonstrates that education grounded in local values while remaining adaptive to global contexts can serve as an effective instrument for cultivating religious moderation.

Political Islam Perspective (Fiqh Siyasah) on DDI's Counter-Radicalism Strategy

This study finds that the educational model and counter-radicalism strategy implemented by Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad (DDI) can be interpreted as a moderate and substantive expression of *Fiqh Siyasah*. This sub-chapter offers a scholarly interpretation rather than a description of DDI's self-understanding. The concepts used here, including *Siyasah Dusturiyah*, *Siyasah Shar'iyyah*, *maslahah*, and *Saddu al-Dzari'ah*, are analytical categories chosen by the researcher, and this study does not claim that DDI leaders invoke this vocabulary in their curriculum planning. Read through this lens, DDI's practice can be understood as treating education as an

instrument of national high politics aimed at safeguarding state stability and public welfare (*maslahah 'ammah*), without being entangled in pragmatic power-oriented politics. Education thereby functions as a strategic arena of political Islam oriented toward civic harmony, ideological resilience, and national integration. The following analysis elaborates this interpretation within the framework of Islamic political jurisprudence.

Using this lens is justified on two grounds. First, DDI operates within the intellectual tradition from which these concepts come: its institutions follow *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah* and the Shafi'i school,[60] so *maslahah* and *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* belong to the legal reasoning that shapes the religious formation of its teachers, even where they are not named in curriculum documents. The lens therefore makes explicit a normative logic that may remain implicit in practice. Second, the lens allows practices to be assessed against standards of Islamic legal reasoning and against the constitutional expectation that educational institutions safeguard national integration, which is the concern that links this study to the field of constitutional law. The analysis accordingly shows that DDI's practices are compatible with, and can be justified by, these concepts; it does not show that they were designed with them in mind. The following analysis elaborates this positioning within the framework of Islamic political jurisprudence.

a. Siyasah Dusturiyah: Legitimizing the Nation-State and Rejecting the Khilafah Narrative

From the perspective of *Siyasah Dusturiyah* (Islamic constitutional jurisprudence), DDI's strategy can be read as affirming the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) as a legitimate *Dar al-Misaq*, a state founded on a social covenant that is normatively valid within Islamic law. This reading is an interpretation by the researcher rather than a description of how DDI leaders themselves frame their position. Its premise is that the Indonesian state rests on a founding agreement among its citizens, and that Muslims who live within that agreement owe it fidelity as a matter of Islamic legal ethics. Other Indonesian religious organizations have articulated comparable ideas, such as the Muhammadiyah concept of *Dar al-Ahd wa al-Syahadah*, which scholars treat as a marker of its moderate stance. The study shows that radical narratives frequently promote the *khilafah* system as a singular solution to socio-political crises while positioning it antagonistically against democratic governance. DDI's practice responds to this discourse by embedding civic and national values within an integrated curriculum aligned with Pancasila.

[60] HS, Parninsih, and Alwi, "Moderasi Beragama Pesantren: Jaringan Dan Paham Keagamaan As' Adiyah, Darul Da'Wah Wal Irsyad, Dan Nahdlatul Ulum Sulawesi Selatan."

Within *Fiqh Siyasah*, this stance reflects obedience to *ulil amri* (legitimate authority) as long as governance does not mandate moral transgression, alongside a principled rejection of *bughat* (rebellion) that is often ideologically disguised within radical movements. Rather than endorsing the symbolic formalization of sharia through institutional models such as the *Khilafah Islamiyah*, DDI prioritizes the substantive realization of Islamic values (*maqasid al-shari'ah*) within the framework of the modern nation-state. This approach underscores that political legitimacy in Islam is measured not by ideological symbolism but by the state's capacity to ensure justice, social order, and public welfare in a plural society.

This acceptance of state authority is, however, conditional, and the legal maxim *tasharruf al-imam 'ala al-ra'iyyah manuth bi al-maslahah* (the ruler's authority over the people is tied to public welfare) explains how it coexists with locally rooted curriculum initiatives. The maxim operates in two directions. Toward the state, it grounds a duty of compliance: where national policy sets curriculum standards that serve public welfare, institutions within the covenant owe obedience, which explains why DDI's curriculum is aligned with Pancasila and national educational policy. Toward the institution, the same maxim limits DDI's own authority over its students, because the freedom to design local content is legitimate only insofar as it serves *maslahah*, here the formation of moderate, civic-minded students who are resilient against extremist ideas. Compliance and initiative are therefore not rivals; both answer to the same criterion of public welfare. In this reading, the top-down layer supplies a binding floor of national standards and national values, and the bottom-up layer supplies a context-sensitive complement, namely Local Wisdom, socially accepted *'urf* that does not contradict sharia, and counter-radicalism values, built on that floor and not against it.

Studies of other DDI institutions describe the same two-layer arrangement. At DDI Baruga in West Sulawesi, the formal curriculum follows the national madrasa curriculum and is binding, while the boarding-school curriculum is autonomous and distinctive; at DDI Pattojo in Soppeng, the madrasa uses the same curriculum as government schools but allocates considerably more hours to religious education; and the history of DDI records that its curriculum was adjusted to that of state schools so that its institutions would be recognized by the government. National law also provides a basis for this autonomy: educational units are allowed to develop local content within national standards, and the Pesantren Law (Law No. 18 of 2019) recognizes pesantren as national education units on an equal footing with others. DDI's organizational structure adds a further layer, since its branch institutions are supervised by the organization itself, so authority

runs from the state, through the organization, to the school, with each level exercising discretion within the limits set above it.

Autonomy in this sense is a bounded and delegated authority, closer to subsidiarity than to independence. The state sets ends and minimum standards, while the institution chooses the means suited to its setting, since those closest to students are often best placed to judge what protects them from local forms of ideological infiltration. Where the two layers diverge, the maxim supplies a test: a top-down rule that fails to serve public welfare in a given setting does not command obedience merely because of its source, and a local initiative that departs from the national framework is not justified merely because it is local. This is also what separates DDI's position from the narrative it counters. Radical advocacy of the *khilafah* rejects the authority of the constitutional order as a whole, whereas DDI's practice accepts that authority conditionally and exercises its own educational discretion inside it, measuring both by *maslahah*. The relationship between state and institution is thus one of participation within the covenant and not of submission or rupture, which is the sense in which the strategy legitimizes the nation-state while rejecting the *khilafah* narrative. As elsewhere in this study, this is an interpretive account of what DDI's practice makes possible and not a report of how DDI leaders articulate the relation between state policy and institutional autonomy.

b. Education as Siyasah Shar'iyyah: Policy-Oriented Governance for Public Welfare

The implementation of a curriculum grounded in *local wisdom*, global competence, and counter-radicalism values constitutes a form of *Siyasah Shar'iyyah*, namely policy-making oriented toward public interest (*maslahah mursalah*).[61] DDI develops an integrative curriculum that connects Islamic knowledge with socio-cultural realities and tolerance-oriented ethics, thereby strengthening resilience against extremist ideological infiltration. This approach aligns with the classical legal maxim *tasharruf al-imam 'ala al-ra'iyyah manuthun bil maslahah*, which posits that institutional authority must operate in accordance with public welfare.

Through educational governance, DDI performs dual protective functions: *hifz al-din* by safeguarding religious understanding from doctrinal deviation, and *hifz al-nafs* by preventing social fragmentation and horizontal conflict rooted in radical ideologies. Education, therefore, is not treated merely as pedagogical transmission but as a long-term governance strategy of political Islam. It operates as a form of normative social engineering that cultivates religious moderation,

[61] Islamul Haq, "Criminalizing Digital Agression: Transforming Moral Fatwas into Virtual Ta'zir Penal Frameworks," *Pattola Syara* 1, no. 1 (2026): 1–22.

civic responsibility, and ideological maturity among students, reinforcing a preventive rather than coercive model of counter-radicalism.

c. Siyasah Madaniyah: Civic Islam and the Role of Religious Organizations

The implementation of a curriculum grounded in Local Wisdom, global competence, and counter-radicalism values can be interpreted as a form of *Siyasah Shar'iyyah*, namely policy-making oriented toward public interest (*maslahah mursalah*) within the limits of sharia.[62] *Siyasah Shar'iyyah* concerns the measures that those holding authority adopt to secure public welfare where no explicit text prescribes them, provided the measures do not contradict the principles of sharia.[63] Curriculum design fits this category because no text dictates how a school should protect students from extremist ideas; the matter calls for welfare-oriented judgment. Read in this way, DDI's integrative curriculum connects Islamic knowledge with socio-cultural realities and tolerance-oriented ethics, thereby strengthening resilience against extremist ideological infiltration. This is an interpretation by the researcher, consistent with the stance of this sub-chapter that the vocabulary of *Fiqh Siyasah* is an analytical lens and not a description of DDI's self-understanding.

The classical legal maxim *tasharruf al-imam 'ala al-ra'iyyah manuth bi al-maslahah*, which holds that the ruler's authority over the people is conditioned on public welfare, explains how this policy-making authority is distributed.[64] As discussed in the preceding section, the maxim grounds compliance toward the state and limits discretion at the institutional level. In curriculum governance this produces three levels of authority, each justified and limited by *maslahah*. The state sets the ends and minimum standards, namely the national curriculum and national values. The organization, DDI, provides the institutional framework within which its branch schools operate and supervises them. The school then chooses the content and methods suited to its setting. Studies of other DDI institutions show this arrangement in practice: the formal curriculum follows national madrasa standards and is binding, while the boarding-school curriculum is autonomous and distinctive; the madrasa uses the same curriculum as government schools but allocates considerably more hours to religious education; and the history of DDI

[62] Haq.

[63] Zulfahmi AR and Muhammad Sa'ad Gadallah, "Eco-Jihad as a Catalyst for Social Transformation: An Interdisciplinary Study of Islamic Environmental Law in Mitigating Climate Change," *Tasdiruna* 1, no. 1 (2026): 13–28.

[64] Hamza Abed Alkarim Hammad dan Muhammad Said, "Islamic Finance and Economic Resilience: Responding to the Climate Crisis with Maqāṣid Principles," *Tasdiruna* 1, no. 1 (2026): 29–44.

records that its curriculum was adjusted to that of state schools so that its institutions would be recognized by the government.[65]

The balance between compliance and local initiative can therefore be understood through three features. First, compliance with national standards is the condition on which recognition and legitimacy rest, so local initiative is built on top of the national floor and does not replace it. Second, autonomy applies above that floor, in the choice of additional religious content, the integration of socially accepted *'urf* that does not contradict sharia, and the way tolerance-oriented values are woven into instruction. National law gives educational units room to develop such local content within national standards,[66] and the Pesantren Law recognizes pesantren as national education units on an equal footing with others. Third, this autonomy is accountable discretion and not independence: a local initiative is justified by its contribution to public welfare, here the protection of students from ideological infiltration, and a national rule is obeyed because it serves the same welfare. Local discretion is valuable for counter-radicalism precisely because those closest to students are best placed to recognize the channels through which extremist ideas reach them in a particular setting, including networks active in the city, and to draw on local culture as a protective resource. Where the two layers diverge, the test is neither the source of the rule nor its locality but its effect on *maslahah*.

Through educational governance, DDI's practice can be read as performing protective functions on several levels. It safeguards the intellect (*hifz al-'aql*) by cultivating critical thinking and digital literacy, it safeguards religion (*hifz al-din*) by protecting religious understanding from doctrinal deviation, and it safeguards life (*hifz al-nafs*) by preventing social fragmentation and horizontal conflict rooted in radical ideologies. Education is therefore treated not merely as pedagogical transmission but as a long-term governance strategy of political Islam. It operates as a form of normative social engineering, a function that studies of pesantren already identify alongside the transmission of religious knowledge and the exercise of social control. It cultivates religious moderation, civic responsibility, and ideological maturity among students, reinforcing a preventive rather than coercive model of counter-radicalism. As elsewhere in this study, these statements are interpretive claims about how DDI's practice can be understood, not reports of

[65] Sitti Syahar Inayah, Husnul Fahimah Ilyas, and M Hamdar Arraiyyah, "Genealogy of Moderate Islam at DDI Pattojo Islamic Boarding School of Soppeng," in *9th Asbam International Conference (Archeology, History, & Culture In The Nature of Malay)(ASBAM 2021)* (Atlantis Press, 2022), 687–92.

[66] Ridha AD, "Keikhlasan Dan Keteladanan AGH Abd. Rahman Ambo Dalle Terhadap Pengembangan Pondok Pesantren Darud Da'wah Wal-Irsyad (DDI)."

how DDI leaders themselves describe the relation between state policy and institutional authority.

d. Saddu al-Dzari'ah in Integrative Curriculum Design

DDI's curricular strategy can be analyzed most precisely through *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* (blocking the means to harm), the legal methodology under which an act, even one that is permissible in itself, is restricted when it serves as a means (*dzari'ah*) leading to *mafsadah* (harm) and that harm outweighs the benefit. Its logic is preventive and attentive to causal pathways: instead of waiting for the harm to occur, it intervenes at an earlier link in the chain that produces it. As an analytical tool it poses three questions to DDI's curriculum: what harm is to be prevented, through which means that harm arrives, and whether the measure taken is proportionate. As in the preceding sections, this is the researcher's interpretation; the study does not claim that DDI leaders use this term in their curriculum planning.

The harm at issue is ideological polarization and national disintegration, the outcome toward which radical narratives that deny the legitimacy of the nation-state tend to move, and which would undermine the covenantal basis of the state discussed above. Studies of radicalism in schools identify the pathways through which such narratives enter: classroom instruction by teachers, textbooks, alumni influence on student activities, and weak policies of school leaders or foundations. Translated jihad books have been documented as one source of religious radicalism in educational institutions. In the language of *Saddu al-Dzari'ah*, each pathway is a *dzari'ah*, and rigid textualism and exclusivist interpretation are the early links through which a student can move from reading doctrine without context to labeling others as deviant and, eventually, to rejecting shared civic life. The findings of this study show DDI's practice addressing several of these links: inclusive teaching materials respond to the textbook pathway, the exemplary conduct of teachers to the classroom pathway, and student organizational activities to the pathway of student and alumni influence. Integrating socially accepted *'urf* that does not contradict sharia with global intellectual competence (*fathanah*) places the intervention at the point where a student would otherwise meet exclusivist readings without the cultural grounding and critical resources to evaluate them. In this sense the curriculum functions to close ideological entry points for transnational radical narratives, which is a claim about its design logic and not a measure of its success.

A distinctive feature of this approach is proportionality. *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* is not a license to close off knowledge: a measure that destroys a greater *maslahah* in order to prevent a lesser

harm fails its own test, and the jurists pair the principle with *fath al-dzari'ah*, the opening of means that lead to benefit. DDI's curriculum reflects this balance. Instead of removing classical texts, it retains them: DDI institutions teach standard texts in the Shafi'i and *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah* tradition, and studies of DDI Pattojo treat the Arabic classical books as the very basis of religious moderation. What the curriculum adds is an embedding of moderation and anti-extremism values across disciplines, and what it blocks is a mode of reading, namely decontextualized, exclusivist interpretation, not access to the texts themselves. Religious understanding (*hifz al-din*) is thereby preserved while the *mafsadah* of polarization is addressed, which is how a preventive measure remains consistent with the maqasid it serves.

This analysis supports a bounded conclusion. The curriculum can be said to function as a preventive mechanism, but the study cannot demonstrate causal prevention: informants' reports that few radical tendencies were observed are consistent with the curriculum working, yet they do not prove it, especially since schools lack standardized indicators for recording such tendencies. Moreover, *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* is fully realized only when prevention extends beyond content to procedures that detect and respond to early signs. The study finds that responses to sporadic cases remain reactive and that not all schools have documented early-detection procedures covering indicators, risk assessment, parental involvement, and tiered referral. Measured against the principle, DDI's practice therefore meets the standard at the curricular level but only partially at the procedural level. For a constitutional-law readership this distinction matters, because an obligation to prevent is institutionalized through rules and procedures and not through content alone, and documenting such procedures would complete the preventive logic that the curriculum already begins.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the counter-radicalism strategy employed by Darud Da'wah wal Irsyad (DDI) is not merely a reactive response, but a preventive approach structured both theologically and pedagogically. The primary findings demonstrate that DDI implements an integrative educational model that synthesizes Local Wisdom as an anchor for cultural identity with Global Intelligence as an instrument for critical thinking. From the perspective of *Fiqh Siyasah* (Islamic Political Jurisprudence), this integration functions as a mechanism of *Saddu al-Dzari'ah* (blocking the means to harm), which effectively obstructs the infiltration of extremist ideologies. Practically, these values are internalized through the curriculum, student

organizational activities, and the exemplary behavior of teachers, which collectively form a moderate educational ecosystem.

The principal strength of this study lies in its novelty in framing DDI's educational praxis through the lens of Islamic Political Law (*Siyasah Syar'iyyah*). Unlike previous studies that tend to focus on security approaches or state-led deradicalization, this research successfully demonstrates that civil society organizations (*Ormas*) possess the independent capacity to safeguard the stability of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) as a *Dar al-Misaq* (State of Consensus). This study makes a theoretical contribution by positioning education not merely as knowledge transfer, but as an instrument of "High Politics" to uphold public welfare (*Maslahah*), specifically in preserving life (*Hifz al-Nafs*) and religion (*Hifz al-Din*).

Notwithstanding these strengths, this research has several limitations that must be acknowledged. First, the geographical scope is limited to DDI institutions in the Makassar region; thus, the findings may warrant contextual adaptation if generalized to other regions with distinct sociocultural characteristics. Second, the qualitative approach relies predominantly on observations and the narratives of internal subjects, and therefore does not present quantitative statistical data regarding the long-term success rates or resilience of alumni against radicalism exposure. Consequently, future research is recommended to expand the study's scope nationally and employ a mixed-method approach to measure the effectiveness of this curriculum model more empirically and comprehensively.

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